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Abstract 
Purpose: Our purpose was to assess failure demand as a lean concept that assists in waste 
analysis during quality improvement activity. We assess whether the concept’s limited use is 
a missed opportunity to help understand improvement priorities, given that a UK Government 
requirement for public service managers to report failure demand has been removed. 
Design/methodology/approach: We look at the literature across the public sector and then 
apply the failure demand concept to the UK’s primary healthcare system. The UK National 
Health Service (NHS) demand data are analysed and the impact on patient care is elicited 
from patient interviews.  
Findings: The study highlighted the concept’s value, showing how primary care systems 
often generate failure demand partly owing to existing demand and capacity management 
practices. This demand is deflected to other systems, such as the accident and emergency 
department, with a considerable detrimental impact on patient experience. 
Research implications: More research is needed to fully understand how best to exploit the 
failure demand concept within wider healthcare as there are many potential barriers to its 
appropriate and successful application.  
Practical implications: We highlight three practical barriers to using failure demand: (i) 
poor general understanding of demand within the healthcare system; (ii) limited 
understanding of systems improvement; and (iii) need to apply the concept for improvement 
and not just for reporting purposes.  
Originality/value: We provide an objective and independent insight into failure demand that 
has not previously been seen in the academic literature, specifically in relation to primary 
healthcare. 
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Introduction 
All public service sector managers are under significant financial pressure, especially after 
the 2007 global financial crisis. The UK Government spending on public services and welfare 
in 2015 was £747bn, but there have been several financial cuts to public expenditure, with the 
2013 financial review requiring £11bn more savings in the 2015/16 budget (ONS, 2016). The 
challenge for service managers is to identify ways to reduce costs without unnecessarily 
cutting service quantity and quality. Many authors looked towards lean or quality 
improvement approaches to achieve sustainable productivity gains without compromising 
services. Attempts to implement such approaches have been met with considerable 
difficulties but some significant improvements have been achieved in various public-sector 
organisations (McNulty, 2003; Lucey et al., 2005; Radnor and Osborne, 2013). 
One approach to implementing lean or systems thinking in the UK public sector is the 
Vanguard Method (Seddon, 2003), which focuses on service purpose, in customer terms, and 
pays attention to service demand type and frequency. Using a systems perspective, the 
method then studies system capability to meet purpose and demand. Like many approaches, 
there is a focus on making work flow through the system and eliminate waste. Vanguard case 
studies about the system have been published (Seddon, 2003, 2008; Middleton, 2010). The 
OECD, in a system review approach to public service improvement, pick out the Vanguard 
Method as one that has led to process innovation and change (Cook and Tonurist, 2012). The 
Vanguard method is a systems approach to services redesign to improve services and 
efficiency. 
One idea contained within the Vanguard Method is failure demand, defined as 
‘demand caused by a failure to do something or do something right for the customer’ 
(Seddon, 2003, p26). In a healthcare context, failure demand might appear in many forms, 
ranging from unnecessary prescriptions or repeated diagnostic tests, to repeat patient 
presentation owing to failure to treat a condition at first contact. Other activities, such as 
unnecessary follow-up visits, might also be classed as failure demand. When discussing 
service improvement, Seddon (2009, p.33) makes a bold claim: ‘In service organisations … 
failure demand often represents the greatest lever for performance improvement. In financial 
services, it can account for anything from 20 to 60 per cent of all customer demand … in 
local authorities and police forces as much as 80-90 are avoidable and unnecessary’. It is 
surprising that failure demand has not received more attention, especially its merits and 
investigation into its use. We seek, therefore, to contribute to knowledge in several ways. 
First, we show how failure demand analyses might be conducted and how this could be used 
to act as a driver for system improvement, based upon existing literature. We critique the UK 
Government’s failed attempt to implement failure demand (adapted and termed avoidable 
demand) as one performance measure that public service managers had to submit in their 
performance reports. Second, we investigate how failure demand might be categorised within 
the UK National Health Service (NHS), focusing on how primary care demand is managed 
and the impact on work in the healthcare. We also include qualitative interviews, which 
examine failure demand’s impact on patients and their service experiences.  
 
Healthcare context  
Projected demographic and societal changes are expected to intensify the pressure on health 
systems and demand new and improved healthcare. Ageing populations in both emerging and 
developed nations are increasing healthcare demand. According to the United Nations, the 
world’s population is expected to increase by one billion people by 2025 (United Nations 
Population Fund 2013); 300 million will be people aged 65 or older, as globally, life 
expectancy continues to rise. Healthcare resources and service innovation are needed to 
support this increase. Countries will be affected differently by these demographic changes. 
Successful and sustainable change will require flexible and adaptive models to fit the new 
health economies. 
Like many other healthcare systems world-wide, the UK’s NHS is under pressure 
from rising deficits, worsening performance and declining staff morale, which means that the 
NHS, a public healthcare system free at the point of use, is facing its biggest challenge for 
many years. The NHS Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014) estimates that the NHS 
needs additional £8 billion a year by 2020/21, and this projection depends on delivering £22 
billion efficiency savings a year by 2020/21; described as ambitious and which requires much 
higher productivity improvements than NHS staff have historically been able to deliver. The 
UK governments have relied on external pressures such as targets, inspection and 
competition to drive reform and improvements (Audit Commission, 1999). This approach has 
delivered mixed results. Examining some high-performing health systems in the UK and 
internationally, suggests that organisation staff, in their pursuit to transform care, should 
ensure leadership, engaging staff and focusing on a clear commitment to put patients first 
(The King’s Fund, 2015). In 2016 NHS England staff took steps to relax the key waiting time 
targets for more than 50 English hospitals to help ease their financial problems (NHS 
England, 2016). The UK think tank, the King’s Fund, called for greater emphasis on how 
services need to change, the starting point being new care models proposed in the NHS Five 
Year Forward View. A recent five-year plan review mentions the need for front-door clinical 
streaming, improving patient flow and managing avoidable demand (NHS England, 2017). 
Here we focus on NHS primary care rather than all healthcare services (e.g., acute 
care). Primary care is often the first contact for people needing healthcare, which is provided 
by professionals such as general practitioners (GPs), dentists and pharmacists. The primary 
care system is responsible for 80% of all contact with NHS patients. Sixty-two percent of 
primary care contact is with a local GP and the rest is mainly with practice nurses. Eighty-
two percent of contact is at practice premises, and an additional 12% by telephone. One issue 
that the NHS must address is what happens when patients require access to primary care 
services when GP facilities are unavailable. ‘Out-of-hours’ (OoH)is usually defined as the 
period 6.30 pm to 8.00 am. The responsibility for this service depends on whether GPs opted 
out of providing OoH care, but in many cases the responsibility now lies with Care 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs), where some or all GPs within a region opted out. English 
CCGs’ original purpose was to give GPs a greater input into how services are designed and 
provided within the community. This led, for example, to the growth in alternative treatment 
provision, such as out-of-hours surgeries, walk-in centres and urgent care centres (Roland et 
al., 2012). 
There have been concerns expressed recently about the primary care system’s ability 
to cope with demand. Dayan et al., (2014) debated the long-term prospects for primary care 
in the UK and highlighted that GPs have experienced a 20% loss in real terms income in 
recent years and there are longer-term recruitment pressures owing to impending retirements 
and recruitment shortages. A recent GP Patient Survey (Ipsos MORI, 2017) reported 32 per 
cent of patients found it difficult to get through on the phone to their surgery, and 16% were 
unable to get an appointment to see or speak to someone the last time they tried. Nearly one 
in five patients (18%) said they tried to contact an NHS service in the past six months when 
they wanted to see a GP, but the surgery was closed, either for themselves or for someone 
else. 
There is some concern that increasing attendances per patient has put pressure on 
patients a GP is able to care for at any time, resulting in an overload on the requests for 
appointments. In the UK, GPs care for typically between 1,700 and 2,000 patients per full 
time equivalent, but there is variation in these figures (HSCIC, 2016). In the United States, 
patient to GP ratio is referred to as ‘panel size’ and there are debates about the correct 
proportion, partly influenced by demographic factors (Murray et al., 2007). There are other 
reasons why access can be limited, including issues with the way GPs manage patient 
schedules and the difficulties associated with recruiting GPs in the UK. Kiran and O’Brien 
(2015, p.399), drawing on the work of Pope et al., (2008), commented: Many primary care 
practices in England misinterpreted advanced access, often embargoing ‘70% of appointment 
slots for same-day appointments, and then requiring patients to call immediately after the 
office opened to book into these embargoed slots …  this resulted in frustrated patients who 
complained that the new system made it impossible to book appointments with their doctors 
in advance. This approach has poignantly been referred to as access by denial’. 
In the winter, 2014, there were considerable issues reported regarding access to UK 
primary care and worse problems associated with long queues and delays in Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) departments, with near gridlocked patient flows across the system (Blunt 
et al., 2015). Patients frequently find there were no available bookable slots for appointments, 
or that waiting times for non-urgent appointments were extending into many weeks’ wait. 
Many GPs keep appointments in reserve as same-day, urgent slots, resulting in long queues 
waiting at surgeries or phoning through early in the morning to gain a same-day appointment. 
Patients who called later in the day were often told to try again the next day as all 
appointments were taken. Similar issues were experienced with accessing emergency services 
in 2015 and again in 2016. Many patients unable to obtain care from their GP will try to seek 
access to other healthcare (NAO, 2015).  
Managing capacity and demand is not well-versed within healthcare. Research 
focuses on secondary care (e.g., hospitals) waiting times and waiting lists management with 
many focusing on how demand and capacity are measured (Silvester et al., 2004). For 
example, Westbury et al., (2009) examine how demand and capacity are measured within a 
discrete surgical speciality, leading to an ability to perform sophisticated analyses and 
achieve further improvements. Walley (2013) reports public services as ‘resource-driven’ 
rather than ‘demand-driven’ when planning resources to meet demand. This approach has 
detrimental effects on the way resources are allocated, especially in the medium term. The 
practical effect is failure to understand demand patterns and how to manage them, creating 
unnecessary queues or wasting resources. The general recommendation is, therefore, that 
pubic service managers should adopt private sector capacity planning practices.  
 
Failure demand 
Failure demand emerged from a telephone call study suggesting that most calls received by a 
sales call centre were, in practice, calls from customers complaining about the service they 
had received or reporting issues for the company to deal with, not the desired calls from 
customers wishing to place orders. Marr and Neely (2004, p.4) argue ‘It is critical to 
understand and classify the nature of demand. Often calls are unwanted or even unwittingly 
generated by other parts of the organization. By analyzing and classifying demand, it 
becomes more manageable and more predictable. Unwanted calls could then be reduced or 
even eliminated.’ Thus, in lean thinking terms, these calls indicate waste in the system and 
handling the call is a waste. A key mistake made by managers was to treat all work coming 
into the system as demand, rather than seeing an opportunity to reduce workload on staff and 
simultaneously improve customer service. These analyses have since been applied across the 
UK public sector, with many reports coming from local council services such as (Randle and 
Kippin, 2014). Housing services are the most widely reported applications, with examples 
provided from several sources (ODPM, 2005; Jackson, et al., 2007; Masters, 2009; Zokaei et 
al., 2010). Figure 1 is adapted from data provided by Seddon (2003), based on Jackson et al., 
(2007), breaking down calls coming into a council housing department call centre. 
 
Figure 1 here        
 
Figure 1 calls are shown as failure demand (darker) and true demand (lighter); the latter 
includes only new demand that has not been requested previously. So, a first call to request a 
plumber is true demand, whereas a follow-up call to enquire when the plumber is arriving is 
failure demand. This analysis is appealing, as it holistically provides a true insight into 
system waste and what is creating that waste. Anyone familiar with traditional lean thinking 
tools would also see the similarity to conventional Pareto analysis.  
 
Failure demand measurement in government 
In 2008, following a pilot study, local government managers were asked to routinely measure 
and report their failure demand. This announcement had been preceded by prior reports into 
contact between public services and the public (Masters, 2009). For example, one 
underperforming local council had been identified as logging two-thirds of all contact as 
waste demand (Caulkin, 2005). Benefits service errors had also been wasteful, where welfare 
under- and over-payments were resulting in considerable unnecessary contact. The cabinet 
office head, Alexis Cleveland, announced that National Indicator 14 (NI 14) would be 
Avoidable Contact, as the Government’s approach to measurement and recording failure 
demand. Measurement started in October 2008 for first reporting in April 2009. The 
Government advice defined avoidable contact in several ways: 
 
1. Unnecessary clarification sought by the customer; a phone call or email asking to explain 
a poorly-worded communication. 
2. Incorrect contact; the customer is passed to the wrong department or transferred to the 
wrong number. 
3. Repeat contact; the customer must contact the organisation multiple times for the same 
reason; e.g., having to report an address change to several departments. 
4. Customers having to progress-chase work, including enquiries why a home appointment 
had been missed or pre-arranged refuse collection had not occurred. 
5. Repeat contact owing to unfinished work, including closing a job request before the work 
had been completed to the customer’s satisfaction (IDEA, 2008). 
The measure was controversial. As one report stated: ‘The underlying aim of NI14 is 
laudable … However, vociferous debate … has been polarised between those who believe 
that NI14 will be an important tool for driving transformation and aligning efficiency … and 
those who believe that NI14 will hinder the process of transformation and divert scarce 
resources to monitoring activities.’ (LGITU, 2008, p.3). Concerns were raised about 
implementing the measure effectively. The LGITU study (ibid) lists potential barriers to its 
implementation: 
 
• Silo mentality (not sharing knowledge or information). 
• Staff training costs. 
• Weak guidance. 
• Poor support from senior stakeholders. 
• Capacity/skill sets internally. 
• Technology infrastructure. 
• Conflicting policy priorities.  
• Poorly joined up services.  
• Proprietary/incompatible systems. 
• Analysis costs. 
• Data collection costs. 
• No budget to implement changes. 
 
These NI14 concerns were probably justified owing to the measure’s longevity. In March 
2010, it was discreetly removed from the Government’s measures (Martin, 2010). The main 
reasons publicly given were technical issues about data collection and reporting costs. It was 
also evident that some council staff were reluctant to report the measure accurately and there 
were concerns about the value that councils were getting out of the measurement. 
 
Failure demand in primary care 
In healthcare, the issue is whether patients can receive the right care in the right location 
without unnecessary delay. Failure demand, should it exist, may include healthcare system 
contact that is either unnecessary extra steps in the process to obtain care, or steps in the 
process that do not provide appropriate care. Comparable studies on access issues use two 
other terms: supplier-induced demand (Bickerdyke et al., 2002) and supply-sensitive demand 
(Dartmouth, 2007) (Table I). In an integrative study, Rosen (2014) found information that 
suggests 16% of patients attending walk-in clinics would not have bothered to seek any care 
if this service had not been available. Additionally, 46% using walk-in centres should not 
have needed to attend before obtaining the care they needed, which added an extra step in 
their journey and created significant extra health service demand/contact. In some cases, no 
treatment was needed but in others, treatment could have been obtained more directly; e.g., 
visiting a pharmacy. The relative proportions are not recorded. Appleby (2013) showed that 
substitutes for emergency visits to primary care or A&E departments, such as walk-in 
centres, minor injuries units and urgent care centres, made no difference to A&E attendance 
rates once they were implemented; in effect, additional demand. 
 
Table I here  
 
Formal reports mentioning failure demand in healthcare are uncommon, but small studies 
indicate the scope and potential for further study. One report (Locality, 2014) included two 
observations that highlight systemic failure demand generated within the healthcare system: 
‘Studying 21 people with health needs revealed that they created 79 demands on the acute 
healthcare system, 75 demands into GPs, 55 demands on district nurses and 30 demands on 
adult social care. Another study analysed eight peoples’ records going back between one and 
nine years. Collectively, these eight individuals exited and re-entered the system 124 times, 
and were subjected to 236 ‘assess–do–refer’ cycles.’ Locality (2014, pp. 16-17). This work 
appears to support the potential for more healthcare failure demand analysis, with the 
possibility that failure demand is considerable across the healthcare system. In our opinion, 
unmet demand within primary care potentially affects the remaining system; e.g., it is 
suggested that unmet primary care demand can flow to the emergency care system, which, in 
turn, can slow down the emergency care system as it struggles to deal with higher demand 
(Blunt et al., 2015).  
 
Research methods 
We combine two studies. First, in March 2015, an expert panel considered the NHS 2014/15 
‘Winter Crisis’. Ninety healthcare management experts convened for a round table 
discussion, studying each healthcare system element and its role in winter pressures. The 
expert panel was chosen from senior managers, healthcare professionals, technical specialists 
and improvement consultants from across NHS organisations (including Scotland and 
Wales), civil service, universities, independent research organisations and private consultancy 
companies. Organisations such as the Nuffield Trust, the Emergency Care Intensive Support 
Team and Monitor were included in the event. The panel was initially split into groups of ten, 
with care taken to ensure diverse specialities represented at each table. After an introduction 
where the Winter Crisis was described in detail, the remaining time was structured into three 
sessions, where an issue was highlighted, and each table was given the opportunity to discuss 
and recording the issues and reporting their findings in a plenary session. These responses 
were summarised by appointed chairs at each table, recorded in word documents, and handed 
over at the end. Other points by individuals were captured on notice boards, which were 
photographed. Discussants were asked to highlight evidence sources for points raised and this 
resulted in 22 follow-up responses with data after the event. The following questions were 
posed: 
 
1. What drives A&E pressures? 
2. What solutions have worked and failed? 
3. Can we model the system to understand change? 
 
The first session included demand in the system and potential failure demand created by 
changes to system capacity over the winter period. To understand the problems, experts were 
asked to provide data on demand patterns in their system. Follow-up work meta-analysed 
existing data and generated demand flow case material and capacity provision across NHS 
England and Scotland, which was used to look at primary care demand, patient flows and 
impact on service quality. We also consider the impact on other services such as the NHS 
111, which is the 24-hour telephone service for patients/relatives when there is an urgent 
healthcare need, but not a 999-emergency call requiring an emergency service response. The 
service is provided by trained advisers who are supported by healthcare professionals. During 
the call, patients/relatives are asked questions about their symptoms before redirecting to the 
best medical care provider. Failure demand issues were also elicited from patient interviews, 
which focused on patient experiences when accessing primary care and managing 
interventions/interactions by/with various community services. Fifteen exploratory interviews 
were conducted with respiratory and cardiac patients who were managing the complexities 
associated with long term conditions. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. 
The data were analysed using a thematic analysis template (King, 2004). This iterative 
approach develops conceptual themes. Where appropriate, quotations were included within 
the findings.  
 
Findings 
We found that demand data are not routinely collected, and it is unclear how much unmet 
primary care demand was not met. Individual primary care systems were not in place to 
capture all potential demand during attempts to access the system; e.g., staff in many 
practices do not monitor or record failed calls when requested services were unavailable or 
appointments rejected by callers for reasons such as the delay between call and appointment 
offered. Staff record activity; i.e. work done, rather than demand. Statistics showed how 
demand is deflected to alternative contact points, especially the 111 services, where there are 
clear, seasonal out-of-hours contact patterns, which are exaggerated during holiday periods 
(Figure 2). These patterns coincide with reduced primary care system capacity; i.e., the 
conventional working week is reduced by public holidays.  
 
Figure 2, 3 and 4 here      
Data show that between 45-55% of calls result in a recommendation to the patient that they 
attend primary care when non-availability was probably the reason for the call to 111. 
Primary care’s effect on the 111 service is identifiable; over the Christmas period, service 
staff struggle to cope with the increased demand at a time when they have their own staffing 
challenges, which results in more abandoned calls (Figure). What happens to demand that 
cannot be met because the primary care is closed when demand occurs – NHS 111 service 
staff have no choice but to pass demand onto emergency care departments if triage suggests 
patients need medical attention. The NHS A&E statistics show how demand patterns emerge 
(NHS, 2015). 
 
Impact on patient care 
Interviewees were reluctant to seek assistance from emergency care service staff. If their 
condition and symptoms allowed, all interviewees preferred to seek assistance from their 
GPs. As patients became more skilled at managing their conditions they reported they were 
more likely to seek assistance early when they could access their GP surgeries or other 
primary care providers, such as specialist community nurses. They reported that advice could 
be via a telephone rather than a face-to-face. The interviewees recalled different appointment 
systems operated by their GP practice staff, with some offering open surgeries (where no 
appointment times are given) but patients are seen based on arrival times. Others mentioned 
the frustrations of ringing for appointments during the morning, often being held in a queue 
before being informed that no appointments were available, and to call back later that day or 
the next morning. One interviewee recalled during the early stages of his respiratory 
condition, that he did not seek medical attention until an acerbation had occurred, which led 
him to attend his local emergency department, which led him to hospital admission. He 
mentioned that his condition worsened in the evenings when he was less likely to have access 
to primary care services. Another patient who became unwell after being discharged after 
heart surgery resulted in an attendance to his local emergency department (on the NHS 
helpline advisor’s guidance). The patient was not admitted but medication was prescribed. 
From regular follow-up appointments with his GP, some four days later, it was evident that 
his visit to the emergency department was not registered with his GP practice. Hence, the 
difficulties associated with detecting and recording failure demand across healthcare 
providers.  
 
Discussion 
One challenge faced by the researchers was to obtain validated primary care demand data at 
practice level. How individual practice staff manage demand means that determining true 
demand on the system is difficult. General practitioners might not understand how much 
unmet demand there is because patient demand is not always recorded. It is not clear from 
our analysis what proportion simply abandon their attempts to obtain medical care when they 
experience problems. Similarly, the way in which GPs attempted to implement advanced 
access inadvertently converts routine demand into emergency demand because routine 
demand cannot reliably be booked in a reasonable timescale. Patients requiring an 
appointment within one week may have to convert this demand into an emergency request. 
This creates failure demand in the emergency care system. Our analysis shows additional 
demand does not increase hospital admissions. Patients unable to access primary care are 
discharged from the system prior to full admission. However, there will be an increase (up to 
50%) in A&E minor patient (e.g., less severe injuries) workload and an unknown increase in 
patients triaged as A&E ‘majors’; i.e., on arrival at A&E, patients are assessed to ensure that 
people with the most serious conditions and life-threatening emergencies, are seen first (NHS 
Choices, 2017). 
Patients are generally reluctant to access emergency services when primary care 
services are lacking. Some patients mentioned that, as they became more confident in 
managing their conditions and are less dependent on their GP and other services. They were 
more able to identify exacerbations or early infections and therefore, accessed appropriate 
services during ‘normal’ opening times. The expert patient programme in the UK is designed 
to help improve patient outcomes. For example, there are formal (often education-based) 
patient expert programmes, which are designed to help patients to manage their condition 
(Griffiths et al., 2007). There were occasions, after seeking advice from national NHS 
helplines, such as 111, where patients were advised to attend their local emergency 
departments or services. Sometimes patients sought advice from specialist community nurses, 
but these seemed to be different across the commissioning landscape, which can be 
problematic, when patients aren’t sure about the care they need, or whether a service is 
available. 
Data strongly suggest that requests recorded within the UK healthcare system can be 
classed as failure demand and there would be a significant reduction in waste and an 
improvement in patient experience if the failure demand is reduced. We question why the NI 
14 measure was removed, and hence why there is currently no pressure to use failure demand 
within the healthcare system. Our literature search and follow-up analysis identify three 
debates: 
 
1. Should demand measurement be continuous? 
Seddon (2009) recommends that demand and failure demand measurement should be a 
snapshot. The overall picture that the failure demand analysis provides is normally a system 
failure through errors and poor system design. He argues that the underlying NI 14 measure 
issue was continuous measurement and the behavioural consequences (in a ‘command-and-
control’ system), which leads to wrong behaviour. One default command-and-control 
behaviour is to develop systems to manage reporting, not address the underlying problems, 
which become a ‘tick box’ exercise. Seddon’s recommendation contrasts with the ODPM 
(2005) report, which encourages the Vanguard method. The ODPM report puts failure 
demand data into a continuous statistical process control (SPC) chart, which shows the 
dilemma faced by users. Although it is expected that failure demand reduces over time as 
systems improve – and the SPC chart demonstrates this system improvement - there are 
problems associated with continually reporting failure demand. It becomes too tempting to 
turn the failure demand measure into a target, where managers intervene when failure 
demand temporarily increases. This continual measurement also misses the point about 
failure demand information’s diagnostic value. If the focus is on how the measure can be 
collected and reported efficiently – without using the data to help improve the system, then 
the purpose of the measure has been missed. 
We could argue that, although demand for healthcare is relatively stable, there are 
periods when demand changes through epidemics or other special events, or because 
decision-making by managers; e.g., changes to ambulance routes and case-mix variation, 
especially monitoring increases in elderly care workload, are also crucial factors that affect 
the system’s ability to cope with demand, which needs to be tracked so that changes are 
identified. Where the mechanisms we have identified are considered, changes in actual 
demand also affects failure demand, and so increases in failure demand may be indicate that a 
system out of control. In UK primary care, failure to understand demands placed on the 
system must be addressed; otherwise appropriate capacity in the system cannot be 
understood. 
 
2. Is failure demand addressed in the right way?  
We made an analogy between failure demand and Pareto analysis in other lean or total 
quality management settings. We suggest that one reasons for limited success in the public 
sector is the linkage between analysis and system behaviour. When a conventional approach 
to process improvement is matched with a failure demand analysis, there may often be a gap 
in the root cause analysis; i.e., why the failure demand occurs. In conventional Pareto 
analysis, diagnosis would be accompanied by system assessment such as a ‘5 whys’ 
assessment. Managers without the appropriate systems training tackle the symptoms, not 
address the system issues (Trbovich, 2014). Failure demand must be linked to full systems 
analysis (including appropriate systems mapping). 
 
3. Is failure demand measurement used for the right purpose? 
Seddon (2009) said that using failure demand to set targets misses its purpose. Our 
experiences suggest that the using failure demand as a performance measure is clearly 
inappropriate and is strictly a diagnostic and indicative tool.  
 
Conclusions 
We open the failure demand dialogue in relation to accessing healthcare emergency services. 
We draw upon UK national demand data and patient experience interviews to convey how 
failure demand might present in healthcare. Our overall aim was to assess failure demand as a 
lean concept to analyse waste during quality improvement activity. Our contribution is three-
fold: first, providing insight in to how failure demand analysis may be conducted, Second, 
showing how failure demand can affect the healthcare system. Third, indicating how failure 
demand affects patients. We confirm that limiting failure demand analysis is a missed 
opportunity to help understand healthcare improvement priorities. We recognise the 
difficulties associated with recording failure demand activity particularly across healthcare 
providers. We focused mainly on NHS primary care. Further research is required, therefore, 
to explore failure demand in other healthcare settings, such as hospital departments. Our 
research has implications for academics, practitioners and policy makers. For academics, it is 
a call to generate further empirical studies to broaden our failure demand understanding, 
particularly within healthcare. For practitioners, there is a need to identify failure demand 
when looking to redesign and improve services. For policy makers, there is a need to support 
managers trying to measure and reducing failure demand within their services. 
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 Table I: Demand types in healthcare 
 
Demand type Description 
Supplier-induced demand Demand created by providers as imperfect care agents  
Supply Sensitive demand Increased health service use stimulated by increased 
(regional) supply 
Induced demand Attendance at walk-in centres or 111 services where the 
patient would not have used a service if it was unavailable 
Induced utilisation Service use following an initial contact with a direct access 
service, which would have occurred even if the direct access 
service was not available and are therefore additional 
attendances 
 
 
Figure 1: Failure demand analysis (Adapted from Seddon, 2003) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Calls to the 111 Service, 3 Nov. 2014 to 1 Feb. 2015 (Adapted from NHS England, 
2015)  
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Figure 3: Abandoned calls at the 111 Service, 3 Nov. 2014 to 1 Feb. 2015 (Adapted from 
NHS England, 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 111 patient referrals to A&E (daily) (Adapted from NHS England, 2015) 
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